[文献]通过声波攻击智能手机和汽车

作者: hackliu 分类: 标准文献 发布时间: 2017-07-18 17:33

     Abstract—Cyber-physical systems depend on sensors to make automated decisions. Resonant acoustic injection attacks are already known to cause malfunctions by disabling MEMS-based
gyroscopes. However, an open question remains on how to move beyond denial of service attacks to achieve full adversarial control of sensor outputs. Our work investigates how analog
acoustic injection attacks can damage the digital integrity of a popular type of sensor: the capacitive MEMS accelerometer. Spoofing such sensors with intentional acoustic interference
enables an out-of-spec pathway for attackers to deliver chosen digital values to microprocessors and embedded systems that blindly trust the unvalidated integrity of sensor outputs. Our
contributions include (1) modeling the physics of malicious acoustic interference on MEMS accelerometers, (2) discovering the circuit-level security flaws that cause the vulnerabilities by
measuring acoustic injection attacks on MEMS accelerometers as well as systems that employ on these sensors, and (3) two software-only defenses that mitigate many of the risks to the
integrity of MEMS accelerometer outputs.

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